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Abstract Unless we fixate directly on it, it is hard to see an
object among other objects. This breakdown in object
recognition, called crowding, severely limits peripheral
vision. The effect is more severe when objects are more
similar. When observers mistake the identity of a target
among flanker objects, they often report a flanker. Many
have taken these flanker reports as evidence of internal
substitution of the target by a flanker. Here, we ask
observers to identify a target letter presented in between
one similar and one dissimilar flanker letter. Simple
substitution takes in only one letter, which is often the
target but, by unwitting mistake, is sometimes a flanker.
The opposite of substitution is pooling, which takes in more
than one letter. Having taken only one letter, the substitu-
tion process knows only its identity, not its similarity to the
target. Thus, it must report similar and dissimilar flankers
equally often. Contrary to this prediction, the similar
flanker is reported much more often than the dissimilar
flanker, showing that rampant flanker substitution cannot
account for most flanker reports. Mixture modeling shows
thatsimplesubstitutioncanaccountfor,atmost,abouthalfthe
trials. Pooling and nonpooling (simple substitution) together
include all possible models of crowding. When observers are
asked toidentifya crowded object,atleast halfoftheir reports
are pooled, based ona combination ofinformation fromtarget
and flankers, rather than being based on a single letter.
Keywords Crowding.Substitution.Pooling.Mixture
modeling
Introduction
In daily life, visual crowding often prevents recognition of
objects in clutter. It is impossible to recognize objects that
are too close together, and the critical spacing for
recognition grows proportionally with eccentricity (Bouma,
1970;L e v i ,2008; Pelli & Tillman, 2008). Crowding
wrecks object recognition, but what remains in its wake?
Analyzing observers’ mistakes during crowding might
elucidate how crowding happens, by revealing how the
mistaken report depends on the stimulus. Observers who
are asked to identify a crowded target often mistakenly
report a flanking object instead (Chastain, 1982; Estes,
Allmeyer, & Reder, 1976; Huckauf & Heller, 2002;
Krumhansl & Thomas, 1977; Põder & Wagemans, 2007;
Strasburger, 2005; Strasburger, Harvey, & Rentschler,
1991; Vul, Hanus, & Kanwisher, 2009; Wolford & Shum,
1980). This basic finding is consistent with two different
accounts of crowding: substitution and pooling. In the
substitution account, observers merely confuse the locations
of the flanker and target objects, perhaps due to positional
uncertainty or failure of attentional selection, and the report
is based on a single object, from the wrong place (Chastain,
1982; Estes et al., 1976; Huckauf & Heller, 2002;
Strasburger, 2005; Strasburger et al., 1991; Vul et al.,
2009; Wolford & Shum, 1980). In the pooling account,
observers combine features across several objects and
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article
(doi:10.3758/s13414-011-0229-0) contains supplementary material.
J. Freeman (*):D. G. Pelli
Department of Psychology and Center for Neural Science,
New York University,
6 Washington Place,
New York, NY 10003, USA
e-mail: freeman@cns.nyu.edu
R. Chakravarthi
Centre de Recherche Cerveau et Cognition,
133 Route de Narbonne, CerCo CNRS UMR 5549,
Faculté de Médecine de Rangueil,
31000 Toulouse, France
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396
DOI 10.3758/s13414-011-0229-0sometimes report a flanker, because that (flanker) object is
similar to (i.e., shares features with) the pooled result (Dakin,
Cass, Greenwood, & Bex, 2010; Greenwood, Bex, & Dakin,
2009; Parkes, Lund, Angelucci, Solomon, & Morgan, 2001;
Prinzmetal, 1995; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982; van den Berg,
Roerdink, & Cornelissen, 2010; Wolford & Shum, 1980).
Any model of crowding must receive the stimulus as
input and produce the appropriate kind of observer response
(e.g., a letter or a word). That is a vast space of possible
models. Particular models—for example, substitution and
pooling—have been carved out of that space. Here, we
carefully define pooling to divide the space in two: pooling
and nonpooling. Pooling models take input from more than
one object and may perform any computation to produce
the response. All other crowding models, forming the
complement to pooling, are nonpooling. Nonpooling
models (which we also call simple or unpooled substitution)
take input from only one (or none) of several presented
objects and may perform any computation on that input to
produce the response. Pooling and nonpooling, together,
make up the space of all possible models of crowding.
Intuition may suggest other ways of breaking up this
space—for example, whether or not there is migration of
objects. However, we do not know how to test that. The
particular division we study here allows for strong tests and
conclusions that sorely discredit all the unpooled models (to
one side of the border) and, thus, recommend the
complement: pooling (on the other side of the border).
Psychophysical testing of models typically requires a nearly
full specification of the model, and, thus, rejects only a tiny
part of the model space. We discovered that nonpooling is
so strong a condition that it has a recognizable, testable
signature in the model behavior, even though we allow the
model to perform any computation whatsoever upon the
restricted input.
Our division is pooling versus nonpooling. We will show
that pooling is needed to model crowding; unpooled
substitution is not enough. Unpooled substitution is simple
substitution, but there are other, more complicated substi-
tution models whose responses depend on multiple letters,
and they are thus pooling models, by our definition. For
example, Wolford (1975) and Wolford and Shum (1980)
described a model in which the response is sometimes
based on a (whole) flanker that replaces the target (i.e.,
unpooled substitution) and at other times based on a few
features of the flanker that have migrated into and
combined with the target (feature perturbations)( i . e . ,
pooling). Van den Berg et al. (2010) proposed a feature
integration model of crowding based on population codes
that exhibits substitution-like behavior—for example,
source confusion. This model uses information from all
objects and thus, by our definition, is a pooling model, not
simple substitution. Our definition of pooling is broad,
including any model that uses information from more than
one object, and thus includes all the crowding models that
average a stimulus parameter (e.g., orientation, position)
across multiple objects (Dakin et al., 2010; Greenwood et
al., 2009; Parkes et al., 2001; van den Berg et al., 2010).
Evidence for pooling in crowding appears in two
literatures: crowding (in spatial vision) and illusory con-
junction (in cognitive psychology). Each has its own
favorite stimuli. Both literatures demand that the experi-
menter know the features of the stimuli.
Spatial vision studies of crowding have used lines or
gratings (Dakin et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2009; Parkes
et al., 2001). These studies have varied a single continuous
feature (orientation or position) of the target and flankers.
The perceived position (or orientation) of a crowded target
is biased toward the average position (or orientation) of the
target and flankers. This demonstrates a simple form of
pooling (averaging) and rejects simple substitution of these
parameters in these stimuli. Gratings and lines are useful
because their features—orientation and position—are easily
specified and pooling can be modeled as averaging over
those features. However, that virtue comes at a cost: The
experimental paradigms and the averaging models are
specific to estimating a scalar parameter of the target. It is
hard to imagine how the paradigms and models might be
generalized to cope with arbitrary tasks and objects, for
which the stimulus-specific pooling rules do not apply. For
example, what is the “average” identity of several letters?
Cognitive psychology studies have described pooling in
illusory conjunction, which is the false perception of an
object that is not present yet is composed of “features” from
objects that are present (Prinzmetal, 1995; Robertson, 2003;
Treisman, 1996; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). For example,
an observer glimpsing a green next to a red might
report seeing a red . Many studies have characterized
illusory conjunctions for color, letter identity, lines, and
simple geometric shapes (Ashby, Prinzmetal, Ivry, &
Maddox, 1996; Cohen & Ivry, 1989; Donk, 1999; Gallant
& Garner, 1988; Ivry & Prinzmetal, 1991; Kanwisher,
1991; Keele, Cohen, Ivry, Liotti, & Yee, 1988; Lasaga &
Hecht, 1991; Prinzmetal, 1981; Prinzmetal, Henderson, &
Ivry, 1995; Prinzmetal & Keysar, 1989; Prinzmetal, Presti,
& Posner, 1986; Rapp, 1992; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982;
Wolford & Shum, 1980). Illusory conjunctions arise when
presentation time is brief, attention is diverted, or stimuli
are presented close together in the periphery (Prinzmetal,
1995; Prinzmetal, Diedrichsen, & Ivry, 2001; Robertson,
2003; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). The third case is the one
most commonly reported. Illusory conjunction is pooling,
and most published reports of illusory conjunction are due
to crowding, so they demonstrate pooling in crowding
(Pelli, Palomares, & Majaj, 2004). But, as with the spatial
vision studies, all the demonstrations of pooling in illusory
380 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396conjunction require the experimenter to first specify the
features.
The studies on pooling rely on knowing the features, but
the multiple features of ordinary objects are usually
unknown, so these studies cannot tell us about pooling of
ordinary objects. To skirt the hurdle of having to define and
specify the “features” of most ordinary objects, which has
limited the scope of previous work, we introduce a new
paradigm that instead asks, for any kind of object, whether
the observer’s response draws information from a single
object (simple substitution) or both the target and a flanker
(pooling).
As usual in psychophysics, we have access only to the
stimulus and the observer’s overt report. We assessed
whether the similarity of target to flanker affected that
report. Similarity is a second-order property (Sperling,
Chubb, Solomon, & Lu, 1994), a relation between two
objects that is meaningless for a single object. Thus, effects
of similarity on errors can be used to show that the report is
based on information from more than one letter. This
approach is reminiscent of multiple-report paradigms in
which observers are asked to make second guesses and the
frequencies of various kinds of error are used to infer
properties of the precategorized representation of the
stimulus (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; Sperling, 1960;
Swets, Tanner, & Birdsall, 1961).
Letters are good objects, by design. They are
familiar, meaningful, named things (Pelli et al., 2009).
We presented three letters side by side, a target between
two flankers, and asked the observer to identify the target
by pressing that key on the keyboard. We manipulated the
similarity between the flankers and the target to control
crowding (Fig. 1), and we characterized the roles of
substitution and pooling in crowding through error
analysis and mixture modeling.
According to the (simple) substitution model, as defined
here, the observer’s response is based on information from
a single letter taken from one of several locations (either
target or flanker), as determined by spatial uncertainty or
attention. Having taken only one letter, the substitution
process knows only its identity, not its similarity to the
target. Thus, the substitution process must report both kinds
of flankers—similar and dissimilar—equally often. As we
will show, contrary to this prediction, the similar flanker is
mistakenly reported much more often than the dissimilar
flanker. This refutes the (simple) substitution model.
However, we wanted more. Models evolve. Our aim was
to discredit simple substitution in general, so it could never
return. We defined pooling as taking information from more
than one letter. We defined simple substitution as taking no
more than one letter from the stimulus. Simple substitution
means not pooling. Disproving simple substitution proves
pooling. However, what if the observer substitutes on some
trials and pools on others? Such a mixture model cannot be
utterly rejected, but we can show that, even in this most
favorable setting, simple substitution provides little help in
explaining the human results.
This study’s approach to modeling may seem unfa-
miliar to some readers. Psychology studies usually
present a particular model that fits the data. The model
is a story, a plausible account of the results. Such
models are often not worth much. Weakly supported,
they change every time new data appear, and they fade
away as time passes and modeling fashions change.
Fitting the data usually provides only weak support,
unlike the strong rejection that would result from failing
to fit. Thus, a particular model that fits is merely a
maybe: a specific account that might be true. Here, we
use mixture modeling to achieve a strong conclusion
that transcends particular fully specified models and
must be true of any viable account of the phenomenon.
We present three experiments. Rather than point to a
single best value for the key parameter, it turns out that our
mixture model is compatible with a range of values, so our
results are presented as upper and lower bounds. Experi-
ment 1 is a direct attack on the simplest form of simple
substitution, flanker-based substitution, in which the re-
sponse is based on only one flanker. The results put an
upper bound on the frequency of flanker-based substitution.
Encouraged by the success of Experiment 1, we raise our
sights in Experiment 2 to challenge the most general
version of substitution. We introduce a mixture model and
an enhanced experimental design. The results put an upper
bound on the frequency of both target- and flanker-based
substitution and, thus, put a lower bound on the frequency
of pooling. Finally, Experiment 3 establishes our para-
Fig. 1 Demonstration of crowding. While fixating the square on the
left, try to identify the middle letter in the triplet below. This is hard.
We think that you will agree that, if you had to name it, you would be
more likely to call the jumbled middle letter M than I. This is the
effect of similarity on errors that we measured in our experiment. Now
fixate the square on the right and try to identify the middle fruit in the
triplet below. (This fruit demo works best in color.) Once again, we
think that you will agree that you would be more likely to call the
jumbled middle fruit an apple than a lemon. Actually, it’s a peach. Our
experiments used letters, but the effect of similarity on errors applies
to any kind of object
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 381digm’s excellent sensitivity, finding that eliminating crowd-
ing greatly reduces pooling.
Method
Observers
Three experienced observers, 24–32 years old, with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, participated in the experi-
ments. Observer A.W. was naive as to the hypothesis; the
other 2 observers were the authors J.F. and R.C.
Stimuli
All stimuli were produced using the Psychtoolbox exten-
sions in MATLAB and were presented on a 19-in. View-
Sonic monitor placed 57 cm from the observer (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997), with 1,024 × 768 pixels at a spatial
resolution of 28 pixel/deg and a frame rate of 100 Hz.
On each trial, the observer was asked to identify a letter
presented on the screen (alone or flanked, central or
peripheral). Fig. 2 shows typical stimuli for Experiments
1–3. The details and the observers differ depending on the
set of measurements: confusion matrices (J.F., A.W., and R.
C.), Experiment 1 (J.F., A.W., and R.C.), Experiment 2 (J.F.
and R.C.), and Experiment 3 (J.F. and R.C.). The confusion
matrix and Experiment 1 used the 26-letter uppercase
alphabet in the Courier font: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQR
STUVWXYZ. Experiments 2 and 3 used a six-letter
alphabet: LTINMW. We varied two parameters (eccentricity
and spacing) slightly among observers to equate overall
accuracy. Letter size (height of an uppercase X) was always
0.9º. Depending on the measurement, the target was
presented either unflanked (alone) or flanked (in a triplet,
between two flankers). When flankers were used, the
center-to-center spacing of the letters was 1.5° (observer
A.W.) or 1° (J.F., R.C.). Depending on the measurement,
the target was presented either at fixation or in the
periphery. When letters were presented in the periphery,
the eccentricity of (the center of) the target was 8º (R.C.) or
10º (A.W., J.F.), and the target was centered on the vertical
meridian in the lower visual field.
The stimulus timing in Experiments 1 and 2 was as
follows (the timing differed for Experiment 3; see below).
At the start of each trial, the observer fixated a small black
square (0.25º wide) at the center of the screen, and the
stimulus was presented below fixation for 150 ms, after
which the letters disappeared but the fixation square
remained. In all three experiments, at the end of each trial,
the observer selected a response (a letter) by pressing that
key on the keyboard. The observers took as long as they
liked to respond. There was no feedback. Each observer
performed 200 trials. Further details of Experiments 1–3 are
presented below.
Similarity
For our experiments, we sought flanker letters that were
either similar or dissimilar to the target. We measured letter-
to-letter similarity by asking each observer to identify a
letter in noise in the peripheral visual field (Fig. 3). We
tabulated the observer’s reports in a confusion matrix
(Bouma, 1971; Townsend, 1971). For each presented letter,
the matrix gave the probability of each letter report. We
imagine that the more features any two letters share, the
more similar they are, and the more frequently they are
confused. Confusion matrices were similar across observers
(average pairwise correlation coefficient between confusion
matrices was .78 ± .04, mean ± standard deviation across 3
observers). There are many other ways that one could
measure similarity, including subjective rating, and we
imagine that they would all yield comparable results.
Manipulating similarity is an effective and convenient way
to control crowding (Kooi, Toet, Tripathy, & Levi, 1994;
Põder, 2007). But it is not the only way. Our paradigm’s
conclusions about pooling depend only on the fact that some
letter pairs are much more crowded than others.
To analyze the similarity of absent letter reports in
Experiment 1, we first normalized each row of the
confusion matrix to eliminate variability due to accuracy
differences across letters. Specifically, for each possible
target letter, we took the corresponding row of the
confusion matrix, set the entry corresponding to the target
to 0, and divided the rest of the entries by their maximum
value. This produced a measure of normalized similarity for
each possible response, ranging from 0 (least similar)t o1
(most similar).
This normalized similarity measure was also used to
assess the similarity of the similar and dissimilar flankers
used in Experiment 1. For that experiment, we chose
flankers that were as similar (or dissimilar) to each target
while satisfying the additional requirements that all 26
Experiment 1 2 3
Fig. 2 Typical stimuli for Experiments 1–3. Each black square is a
fixation mark. The letter triplet is peripheral (center is 8° to 10° in the
lower visual field) in Experiments 1 and 2 and central (0°) in
Experiment 3. In Experiment 1, the two flankers are different: similar
and dissimilar to the target. In Experiments 2 and 3, they are the same:
Both are similar or dissimilar to the target
382 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396similar flankers should be unique (no repeats), all 26
dissimilar flankers should be unique, and pairs of (dissim-
ilar) targets should share the same pair of flankers: similar
and dissimilar for one target versus dissimilar and similar
for the other target (Fig. 4). These lists were constructed by
first picking a similar flanker for each target, ensuring
uniqueness. Then the targets were grouped into pairs; any
such grouping fully specified the dissimilar flanker for each
target, because of the requirement that pairs of targets
should share the same pair of flankers. Different groupings
into pairs were tried until the average dissimilarity was
close to 0. All of these constraints resulted in slightly less
similarity (and more dissimilarity) than would be obtained
without these requirements. The average normalized simi-
larity of the similar flankers was .74 ± .08, and for the
dissimilar flankers, it was .02 ± .02 (as compared with the
values of 1 and 0, respectively, that would be obtained
without constraints) (mean ± standard deviation across 3
observers).
Mixture modeling
According to the simple substitution (or nonpooling) model
defined here, the observer’s response is based on informa-
tion from a single letter unwittingly taken from one of
several locations, as determined by spatial uncertainty or
attention. That is the only constraint on the (simple)
substitution model’s computation. On some trials, the
substitution model takes in a target, which it need not
Target
Similar
Dissimilar
Fig. 4 The two flankers, similar and dissimilar, used with each target
in Experiment 1. These are for observer J.F., based on his confusion
matrix (Fig. 3). Lists for the other observers were much like these. The
list was constructed by choosing flankers that were as similar (or
dissimilar) to each target while satisfying the requirements that all 26
similar flankers should be unique (no repeats), all 26 dissimilar
flankers should be unique, and pairs of targets (e.g., A and G) should
share the same pair of flankers (e.g., N and C), similar-and-dissimilar
foronetargetversusdissimilar-and-similarfortheothertarget.Thus,each
flanker pair—for example, N and C—was equally likely to be similar-
and-dissimilar as dissimilar-and-similar.This symmetrical distribution of
the flankersmade the joint distribution of the two flankers independent
of the similarity of the flankers to the target. On each trial, the target was
randomly selected (A–Z) and displayed between the similar and
dissimilar flankers specified here, placed randomly left and right or
right and left of the target. Thus, on each trial, each of the three letters
could be any letter A–Z with equal probability
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Fig. 3 Similarity. a The observer fixated a small black square at the
center of the screen. A dark uppercase letter of size (height) 0.9º was
presented for 150 ms. It was centered on the vertical meridian in the
lower visual field at an eccentricity of 10º (A.W., J.F.) or 8º (R.C.).
Independent noise drawn from a zero-mean uniform distribution was
added to each pixel of a 2.25º × 2.25º square region containing the
letter. In the experiment, the background was gray (42 cd/m
2),
matched to the mean luminance of the region containing the letter,
but in this illustration, the background is white. The task was to
identify the target letter. The noise level (range of the uniform
distribution from which the noise is drawn) was adjusted to roughly
match accuracy across observers (41% ± 5% frequency of correct
responses, average ± standard error across 3 observers; chance
performance was 4%). While fixating the black square, one would
find it hard to tell the letter. It could be a G,aC,aQ,o ra nO. After
being displayed for 150 ms, the target and fixation square disappeared,
and after a 200-ms delay, a response screen showed all 26 letters as
possible responses. The observer moved the mouse-controlled cursor
to select a response, after which the response screen disappeared. The
feedback tone was high-pitched for correct and low-pitched for
incorrect. After another 200-ms delay, the fixation square reappeared,
and after 1 s, the next letter appeared. In a single session, each letter
was presented 20 times, for a total of 520 trials. Observers did four
separate sessions, for a total of 80 trials per letter. b We measured a
confusion matrix for each observer. The confusion matrix for observer
J.F. is shown on the right. Each row of the matrix corresponds to a
different target letter (A–Z). The gray level of each cell indicates the
fraction of trials on which the target was reported as a particular letter
(A–Z)
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 383report faithfully; we call that target substitution. Otherwise,
the substitution model takes in a flanker, which it need not
report faithfully; we call that flanker substitution. On every
trial, the model takes in a target or a flanker. The measured
performance is an average across trials whose reports are
flanker and target based. In general, the reported letter is
only statistically related to the letter taken in, like reporting
a letter in noise. So, even if it takes in the target, the
substitution model may erroneously report another letter. In
Experiment 1, the substitution model could report a flanker
by (unwittingly) taking in that flanker and reporting it
faithfully or by taking in the other flanker or the target and
reporting it unfaithfully.
(Simple) substitution is a special case of a completely
general model, which we call general pooling. General
pooling is constrained only to receive the stimulus and give
a response of the kind demanded by the task. The response
may have any deterministic or statistical dependence on the
stimulus. General pooling includes, as special cases, all
models of crowded and masked target identification that we
can imagine, including simple substitution. As we will see,
simple substitution fails to fit the results, and general
pooling, of course, fits perfectly. How well would a mixture
of these two models fit? The goal here is to assess the
explanatory power of the substitution model without
insisting that it explain every trial. After all, we are
explaining the responses of an intelligent willful observer
who might change strategy unpredictably from trial to trial.
We do not want to reject substitution just because the
observer occasionally does something else. To that end,
trying to be realistic, we assume a very general framework—a
mixture model—in which either substitution or general
pooling occurs randomly on each trial (see “Mixture Model,”
2011, in Wikipedia). The mixture model creates the most
favorable possible condition for substitution, assigning it as
many of the trials as possible, supposing that the rest are
performed by general pooling. Our pooling model is
deliberately vague (i.e., general) in order to provide a
generous test of substitution. It needs to be general to serve
the purpose of giving substitution its best chance to flower.
By fitting the human results (minimizing a cost that includes
the fraction of trials assigned to general pooling), we
discover how large a role substitution can play and still
allow the mixture model to fit well.
This model mixes three processes: a flanker-based
process, a target-based process, and a target-and-flanker-
based process. The two single-letter processes substitute,
and the multiple-letter process pools. We will occasionally
refer to the mixture of the two single-letter processes as the
substitution process. We are particularly interested in the
flanker-based substitution process because it is the simplest
way to explain mistaking the target for a flanker. Flanker-
based substitution is the heart of the substitution account, as
the advocates of substitution and pooling—subbers and
poolers—agree. When observers report flankers, as they
often do, how many of those reports are due to flanker-
based substitution? The mixture model is presented in the
Appendix.
Experiment 1: Crowded. Similar and dissimilar
Experiment 1 was a classic crowding task. Three observers
participated (J.F., A.W., and R.C.). At the start of each trial,
the observer fixated a small black square at the center of the
screen, and the target was presented in the lower visual
field (centered on the vertical meridian), with a flanker on
either side. The observer was told that a triplet of letters
would be presented in the periphery, a target between two
flankers, and that he or she should identify the target,
ignoring the flankers.
We used each observer’s confusion matrix to tailor the
triplets to the observer. The confusion matrix was based on
identifying letters in noise (Fig. 3). Each target was
assigned two flankers, one that was similar to the target
and one that was dissimilar (Fig. 4). Pairs of targets shared
the same pair of flankers: similar and dissimilar for one
target, and dissimilar and similar for the other. On each
trial, the two flankers were randomly placed next to the
target (left and right or right and left). The assignment of
flankers (Fig. 4) ensured that, on each trial, the letter at each
location could be any letter A–Z, with equal probability. A
single letter told nothing about similarity among the letters
in the triplet.
Similarity proof
Here follows a proof that if the observer's response is based
solely on one flanker, the probability of reporting a flanker
similar to the target must equal the probability of reporting
a flanker dissimilar to the target. In Experiment 1, each trial
presented a target letter between two flanker letters, one
similar and one dissimilar to the target. The pair of flankers
was determined by the target, but their left–right ordering in
the display was random. Each flanker’s distribution (A–Z)
was independent of its similarity to the target. Thus, if the
response depended solely on one flanker, the probability of
reporting that flanker would be independent of its similarity
to the target. Furthermore, the joint distribution of the two
flankers was independent of their similarity to the target.
Thus, if the response depended only on one flanker, the
probability of reporting the other flanker would be
independent of the similarity of the two flankers to the
target. Flanker substitution cannot distinguish similarity.
Table 1 presents the fraction of trials on which the
observer reported the target or (wrongly) reported a similar
384 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396flanker, dissimilar flanker, or absent letter (neither target
nor flanker). As was expected, crowding made all 3
observers perform poorly. They averaged only 32% ± 4%
correct identification of the target, but this was still well
above chance, which was 1/26 = 4%. They often
reported the flankers (32% of trials), confirming previ-
ous studies (Krumhansl & Thomas, 1977; Strasburger,
2005). Do flanker reports favor the similar flanker? If
flanker substitution accounts for all flanker reports, then
the two flankers (similar and dissimilar) are equally likely
to be reported. In fact, we found that observers far more
frequently reported the similar (23%) than the dissimilar
(9%) flanker (Table 1 and Fig. 5a). Each observer’sd a t a
disprove the prediction that the two flankers are equally
likely to be reported (p < .01 for each observer
individually, two-sided permutation test, for 3 observers).
The frequency of similar-flanker reports was also signif-
icantly greater than the frequency of dissimilar-flanker
reports in a random-effects analysis across observers
[p =. 0 2 6 ,t(2) = 6, two-sided paired t-test]. In this
experiment, unless the target was known, the flanker
identity provided no hint as to whether it was similar or
dissimilar to the target. Thus, the observed preference for
similar over dissimilar flankers proves that at least some
of the observer’s mistaken reports were at least partly
based on the target.
This rejects flanker substitution as a full account. Maybe
that’s a straw man, but we now raise our sights to challenge
the most general form of (simple) substitution.
Table 1 Response rates in Experiment 1: Crowded. Similar and
dissimilar
Average J.F. R.C. A.W.
Target 32% ± 4% 25% 32% 38%
Similar flanker 23% ± 3% 27% 25% 16%
Dissimilar flanker 9% ± 1% 12% 9% 7%
Absent letter 36% ± 1% 36% 34% 39%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Experiment 1: Average ( ± standard error across 3 observers) and
individual frequency of the four kinds of responses produced by the
observer when asked to identify a crowded target: the target, the
similar flanker, the dissimilar flanker, or an absent letter (neither target
nor flanker). The stimulus was a target flanked by a similar and a
dissimilar letter, one on either side, such as CGE. Percentages are
rounded to the nearest integer. Where necessary, rounding is adjusted
to ensure that the percentages for the four different types of responses
add up to 100%. These data reject flanker substitution as a complete
explanation. As part of a mixture model, a flanker substitution process
can account for, at most, 55% of the trials that produced these results
(see the Results section and the Appendix, Eq. 4).
**
Similar flankers
Dissimilar flankers
Similar trials
Dissimilar trials
F
l
a
n
k
e
r
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
r
a
t
e
F
l
a
n
k
e
r
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
r
a
t
e
0%
25%
75%
50%
JF RC
A B
Experiment 1
Crowded
Similar and dissimilar
Experiment 2
Crowded
Similar or dissimilar
Similar trials
Dissimilar trials
Experiment 3
Not crowded
Similar or dissimilar
0%
25%
75%
50%
C
**
JF RC
F
l
a
n
k
e
r
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
r
a
t
e
***
0%
10%
20%
30%
JF RC AW
Fig. 5 The effect of crowding on flanker reports. a Flanker report
rates in Experiment 1 for similar flankers (dark bars) and
dissimilar flankers (light bars). All 3 observers reported the flanker
that was similar to the target much more often than the one that was
dissimilar. The error bars extend from the 16th to 84th percentiles of
the bootstrapped distribution. The difference is significant for every
observer and disproves the prediction of flanker substitution that
similar and dissimilar reports are equally likely (*p < .01, two-sided
permutation test). As part of a mixture model, flanker substitution can
account for, at most, 55% of the trials (see the Results section, Table 1,
and the Appendix, Eq. 4). b Flanker report rates in Experiment 2 on
trials where the flankers were similar to the target (dark bars) and
dissimilar (light bars). Both observers reported the flanker more than
twice as often on similar than on dissimilar trials. The difference is
significant for both observers (*p < .001, one-sided permutation test).
Fitting all trials with a mixture model, we find that flanker substitution
accounts for 29% of trials and target substitution accounts for 28%.
The remainder (43%) require pooling (see the Results secion, Table 2,
and the Appendix, Eq. 7). c Flanker report rates in Experiment 3, in
which the letter triplets were presented at fixation to eliminate
crowding. Without crowding, flanker reports are greatly reduced. In
the mixture model, target substitution accounts for 84% of all trials,
and substitution, of any kind, accounts for 92% (see the Results
section, Table 3, and the Appendix, Eq. 22). Pooling (8%) is still
needed to account for the discrepancy between similar and dissimilar
trials
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 385From these results, the Appendix derives an upper bound
on the frequency of flanker substitution. To maximize the
supposed role of the flanker substitution process, our
mixture model attributes all the dissimilar-flanker reports
(9%) to flanker substitution. This process is blind to
similarity (since it sees only one letter), so it will produce
similar-flanker reports at the same rate, which accounts for
less than half of the similar-flanker reports (23%). Thus,
even though the flanker substitution process was invented
to explain flanker reports, it accounts for less than half of
the similar-flanker reports. Something other than flanker
substitution, either target substitution or pooling, must
account for the rest.
Even though this experiment used a classic crowding
task, it is conceivable that something else, such as acuity or
lateral masking, might account for some of the mistakes.
Did the observer have enough acuity to identify the target
alone? With the stimulus parameters of Experiment 1,
observers accurately identified an unflanked letter in the
periphery or a flanked letter at fixation. We quantified this
in one observer (J.F.). The observer identified an isolated
(unflanked) letter in the periphery. Everything was the same
as in Experiment 1 for observer J.F., except that there were
no flankers. The observer did 100 trials. We find that
accuracy for an unflanked target was 96% (as compared
with 34% flanked), which shows that acuity accounts for
very few mistakes, if any.
To test for possible lateral masking effects other than
crowding, the observer identified a target between two
flankers at fixation. [Everything was the same as in
Experiment 1 for observer J.F., except that the triplet was
presented centrally (at 0°) instead of peripherally; the
fixation square disappeared during stimulus presentation.
The observer did 100 trials.] Many different mechanisms of
lateral masking have been proposed, and it would be hard
to rule them all out one-by-one, but crowding is unique in
that it is negligible at fixation, whereas the other effects
have little dependence on eccentricity. We eliminated
crowding from the experiment by moving the stimulus to
fixation, which abolished crowding while preserving the
other lateral masking effects. Crowding goes away because
the letter spacing far exceeded the tiny 0.06º critical spacing
at fixation (Toet & Levi, 1992). When we did this,
performance rose from 34% to 99%, indicating that
practically all mistakes at the original peripheral location
were due to crowding.
Experiment 1 places an upper bound on the frequency of
flanker substitution by showing that more than half of
similar-flanker reports depend on the target (see the
Appendix). However, the remaining trials could still be
due to either target-based substitution or pooling. As was
mentioned above, the only constraint on the substitution
processes (either target or flanker based) is that they use
information from only one letter location, selected unwit-
tingly. Thus, flanker reports, especially similar-flanker
reports, could be mistaken responses to the target, as a
result of target substitution.
Recall that target substitution means that the observer’s
response is based solely on the target, but the report might
not be faithful (i.e., it can be wrong). It may be like
reporting a target in noise. Perhaps the observers’ responses
are all due to target substitution and the higher rate of
similar-flanker reports occurs because target substitution
reports letters that are more similar to the target. If this were
the primary cause of similar-flanker reports, we might also
expect absent letter reports to be similar to the target. To
check for this, we asked, on absent letter reports, how
similar the reported absent letter was to the target. We
assessed these similarities using each observer’s confusion
matrix. The average similarity between absent letter and
target was .27 ± .05, only slightly higher than the value
of .19 one would expect if the observer was randomly
guessing (n =3 ) .
1However, this is inconclusive about the
role of target substitution, because perhaps target substi-
tution favors only the most similar letter, which is always
present and, thus, not among the possible “absent” letters
responses. So we enhanced the experimental paradigm to
assess target substitution.
Experiment 2: Crowded. Similar or dissimilar
Experiment 1 tested each flanker with various targets;
Experiment 2 additionally tested each target with various
flankers. Experiment 1 tested flanker substitution; Experi-
ment 2 also tested target substitution. Flanker substitution is
ignorant of the target, and target substitution is ignorant of
the flankers.
Two observers participated in Experiment 2 (J.F. and R.
C.). Size, spacing, eccentricity, and the method of response
were identical to those in Experiment 1. On each trial of
Experiment 2, the target was surrounded by two flankers,
which were identical to each other. The target and flanker
were drawn independently from the same six-letter alphabet
containing two groups of three letters (LTINMW ). The
letters were similar within each group but dissimilar across
groups. On each trial, the target and flanker were each
selected randomly and independently from the six-letter
alphabet, so the flanker could be identical (17%), similar
1 We also assessed how similar the reported absent letter was to the
similar and dissimilar flankers. These similarities were .26 ± .04
(similar flanker) and .22 ± .02 (dissimilar flanker). Both were only
slightly higher than the value of .19 expected under random guessing.
But this result is inconclusive regarding flanker substitution, because
flanker substitution may favor only the most-similar letter, which is
always present and not among the possible absent responses.
386 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396(33%), or dissimilar (50%) to the target. Across many trials,
each flanker appeared with various targets, and, unlike in
Experiment 1, each target appeared with various flankers.
The observer knew the six possible letters, and the response
had to be one of them.
As in Experiment 1, the flanker-substitution process saw
only a flanker, so its probability of faithfully reporting the
flanker was independent of the flanker’s similarity to the
target. However, we found that the flanker was reported
much more frequently when it was similar (60%) than when
it was dissimilar (24%) (average of 2 observers; see Table 2
and Fig. 5b). Supposing that all flanker reports are due to
flanker substitution predicts that flanker reports are equally
likely on the two types of trial. Data from each observer
disproved this prediction (p < .001 for each observer
individually, one-sided permutation test, for 2 observers).
More important, because each flanker was presented
with various targets and each target was presented with
various flankers, Experiment 2 allowed us to place an upper
bound on the frequencies of both target- and flanker-based
substitution. Specifically, we implemented the mixture
model to estimate the contributions of the three processes
(see the Appendix). The observer’s performance in each
condition (each entry in Table 2) was modeled as a linear
combination of the probabilities that each of the three
processes (target substitution, flanker substitution, and
pooling) would be invoked. The model fitting minimized
the weighted sum of total squared error and the probability
of pooling. Recall that our modeling effort is asymmetric,
by design. (Simple) substitution is specific(with few
degrees of freedom), and general pooling is completely
general (with as many degrees of freedom as the human
data). The goal was to discover how large a role
substitution could play and still allow the mixture model
to fit well. Fitting the data from Experiment 2 indicates that
no more than 57% of the trials in this experiment were due
to target- or flanker-based substitution (Appendix, Eq. 7).
Pooling must account for the remaining 43% of the trials
and can explain all of them, whereas simple substitution is
not needed and can explain, at most, 57% of the trials.
When observers were asked to identify a crowded object,
nearly half of their reports were pooled, on the basis of a
combination of information from target and flankers, rather
than being based on a single letter.
(Simple) substitution, with its few degrees of freedom,
might seem to deserve praise for having accounted for
about half of the trials in our mixture model of Experiment
2. However, much of the credit for this achievement should
go to pooling, which uses its many degrees of freedom to
account for the aspect of human performance that substi-
tution cannot. The human observer response depends on
similarity between letters, and substitution’s does not. The
mixture model manages to attribute about half the trials to
substitution only because pooling graciously accommodates
substitution’s blindness to similarity by using its many
degrees of freedom to never report a target among similar
flankers and never report a dissimilar flanker. If we
intervene, setting more-plausible nonzero lower bounds
for such reports by the pooling process (Appendix, Eqs. 17
and 18), the maximum role of substitution is reduced from
57% to 32% of trials.
Experiment 3: Not crowded. Similar or dissimilar
In a third experiment, we established our paradigm's
excellent sensitivity to crowding. Specifically, if the
stimulus conditions are changed so that observers still
make mistakes but the mistakes are not due to crowding,
we would expect to attribute far fewer of them to pooling.
The control experiment described above for Experiment 1
presented the stimulus centrally, instead of peripherally, to
eliminate crowding. It found very few errors and, thus,
ruled out the contribution of lateral masking to the
observer’s mistakes. Experiment 3 also presented the
stimulus centrally to rule out crowding but introduced
other factors (reduced duration, post-mask) to cause errors,
and we show that the errors do not reflect pooling.
Two observers (J.F. and R.C.) participated in Experiment
3. The size, spacing, method of response, alphabet, and trial
types were identical to those in Experiment 2. However,
instead of presenting letter triplets in the periphery (at 10º,
as in Experiments 1 and 2), letters were presented at
fixation (the target was centered at 0º) to eliminate
crowding. There was no crowding of this stimulus at
fixation, because the letter spacing far exceeded the tiny
0.06º critical spacing (Toet & Levi, 1992). To restore
Table 2 Response rates in Experiment 2. Crowded. Similar or
dissimilar
Identical Trial Similar Trial Dissimilar Trial
Target 88% ± 1% 23% ± 7% 47% ± 4%
Flanker n/a 60% ± 6% 24% ± 1%
Absent 12% ± 1% 17% ± 1% 29% ± 4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Experiment 2: Average ( ± standard error across 2 observers)
frequency of the three kinds of responses produced by the observer
when asked to identify a crowded target: the target, the flanker, or an
absent letter (neither target nor flanker). The stimulus was a target
between two identical flankers. On each trial, the target and flanker
were independent random samples from the same six-letter alphabet:
L T I N M W. The three types of trials were flanker identical to target
(e.g., WWW; 17% of trials), similar to target (MWM; 33%), and
dissimilar to target (LWL; 50%). Substitution can account for, at most,
57% of the trials that produced these results (see the Results section
and the Appendix, Eq. 7).
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 387difficulty to the task, we reduced the stimulus duration from
150 ms to either 70 or 80 ms (adjusted to roughly match
performance between observers), and the triplet was
immediately followed by a post-mask. The post-mask was
a triplet of three randomly chosen letters (from the 26 letters
A–Z), presented with the same size, location, and duration as
the target and flankers. Without these manipulations, perfor-
mance would be nearly perfect. These conditions yielded
performance of57%±6%correct targetidentification(n =2 ) .
The fixation square was on at all times, except for when the
triplet and the post-mask were presented.
As is reported in the Appendix, we fit the same model as
that in Experiment 2 to the observer’s data in each
condition (each entry in Table 3) and found that pooling
on only 8% of the trials was enough to account for the
measured performance, leaving the rest to substitution
(primarily target substitution). Performance in Experiment
3 thus primarily reflected responses based solely on the
target (which could be either correct or incorrect, just as a
single letter in noise can be reported correctly or not). This
8% lower bound on pooling without crowding was less
than a quarter of the 43% lower bound on pooling with
crowding found in Experiment 2. Without crowding,
substitution accounted for 92% of the trials. These data
demonstrate the sensitivity of our paradigm: When factors
other than crowding impair performance (e.g., brief
duration and post-mask), we find very little pooling, and
substitution reigns.
Discussion
Our findings refute past suggestions of rampant unpooled
substitution during crowding (Chastain, 1982; Estes et al.,
1976; Huckauf & Heller, 2002; Strasburger, 2005;
Strasburger et al., 1991; Vul et al., 2009; Wolford & Shum,
1980) and extend existing evidence for pooling in crowding
(Dakin et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2009; Parkes et al.,
2001; Prinzmetal, 1995; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982; van
den Berg et al., 2010; Wolford & Shum, 1980) to ordinary
objects whose features are not known. Many studies of
crowding have shown that flanker similarity increases the
effect of crowding on target identification performance, and
these effects motivated our use of similarity to manipulate
crowding (Andriessen & Bouma, 1976; Estes, 1982; Kooi
et al., 1994; Krumhansl & Thomas, 1977; Põder, 2007).
Studies of illusory conjunction have also shown that such
binding errors increase with similarity (Ivry & Prinzmetal,
1991), and in so far as these errors likely reflect crowding
(Pelli et al., 2004), these studies also show that similarity
increases crowding. Our key finding, however, is not that
similarity affects the frequency of making a mistake, but
that it systematically influences the identity of the mistake
and that the resulting pattern of errors constrains a
substitution model in which the observer draws information
from only one object. Flanker reports during crowding are old
news. Our paradigm reveals that the flanker reports reflect
pooling and cannot be explained by unpooled substitution
alone. Thus, although we manipulated the similarity of letters
(and fruit) to control crowding (Fig. 1), this article is not
about similarity, letters, or fruit. It is about crowding. We
find that flankers that crowd more are reported more. This
severely limits the potential role of unpooled substitution in
crowding. It shows that crowding is pooling.
This article has considered a low-level substitution process
that unwittingly takes in a stimulus letter, before crowding,
before any lateral interaction. A clever proposal from an
anonymous reviewer instead attributes the results of Experi-
ment 1 to the observer’s intentionally taking a letter from his
crowded internal representation. The reviewer notes that the
dissimilar flanker will be less crowded by the target than will
the similar flanker. Thus, the observer may often see one
identifiable letter next to a two-letter jumble. It might be a
good strategy to report a letter unlike the identifiable one. We
asked our observers, and they denied using this strategy, but
they might yet have done so without realizing it. This puts a
new light on the results of Experiment 1, but the reviewer's
proposal is inapplicable to Experiment 2, in which the left
and right flankers are the same. Any model that incorporates
effects of similarity is getting information from several letters
and is thus a pooling model, by our definition.
Our results refer to the pooling of unknown features
across letters, whereas several previous descriptions of
pooling in crowding (and rejections of substitution) have
dealt exclusively with simple, known features (Dakin et al.,
2010; Greenwood et al., 2009; Parkes et al., 2001; van den
Berg et al., 2010). Results obtained with such stimuli, such
Table 3 Response rates in Experiment 3: Not crowded. Similar or
dissimilar
Identical Trial Similar Trial Dissimilar Trial
Target 63% ± 2% 52% ± 3% 60%±8%
Flanker n/a 22% ± 1% 10% ± 3%
Absent 37% ± 2% 27% ± 3% 33% ± 4%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Experiment 3: Much like Experiment 2 (Table 2), except that the
stimulus (target and flankers) was at fixation instead of in the
periphery. Shown are the average (±standard error across 2 observers)
frequencies of the three kinds of responses produced by the observer
when asked to identify the target letter: the target, the flanker, or an
absent letter (neither target nor flanker). Unlike in Experiment 2, the
target was not crowded, because it was presented at fixation. To
restore difficulty, despite the central presentation, the stimulus was
presented briefly (70 or 80 ms), and was followed by a post-mask.
Substitution accounted for 92% of the trials that produced these results
(see the Results section and the Appendix, Eq. 22)
388 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396as lines and gratings, do not readily predict the character-
istics of flanker reports during the perception of ordinary
crowded objects. Our method provides a way to prove that
when objects are crowded, observers use information from
more than one object. The paradigm is applicable to any
object, and the demo in Fig. 1 indicates that the results
found with letters generalize at least to fruit.
To reach a lasting conclusion, our simple substitution
model (i.e., unpooled) assumes only the essential: taking at
most one letter, possibly from the wrong place. To assess
that idea, without insisting that it explain every trial, we
introduce the general pooling process to handle the rest of
the trials. Altogether, this is a mixture model. The
probability of using the general pooling process is a
parameter. The cost minimized by the fitting includes that
parameter. Fitting this mixture model to our experimental
results reveals an upper bound on the fraction of trials
(about half) that can be attributed to unpooled substitution—
that is, any report process that takes in only one letter. This
conclusion is strong (based on rejection), and broad, applying
to all models that do not pool.
The reader may be impressed that with few degrees of
freedom, unpooled substitution accounts for half of the trials.
However, creditwhere creditisdue.One shouldacknowledge
that the unpooled substitution process abuses the generous
hospitality of the mixture model and demands too much from
the accommodating general pooling process. The observer is
affected by similarity, and unpooled substitution is not. The
mixture model fits well only because the general pooling
process, with its many degrees of freedom, is very accommo-
dating. To make up for unpooled substitution’sb l i n d n e s st o
similarity, the general pooling process never reports the target
on similar trials and never reports the flanker on dissimilar
trials. Supposing that any plausible pooling process must
occasionally give these responses, and specifying plausible
lower bounds severely curtails the degree to which pooling
can make up for unpooled substitution’s deficiencies, reduc-
ing the maximum role of unpooled substitution from 57% to
32% of trials (Appendix E).
Conclusion
The simple substitution model once provided an elegant and
parsimonious account of existing results. Its proponents
divided the space of possible explanations, paving the way
for experiments, like ours, that distinguish the two sides.
Illusory conjunction and averaging of orientation and position
are obviously pooling, not simple substitution, but these vivid
demonstrations are restricted to cases in which one knows the
features. Our results reject simple substitution—defined as
taking information from at most one object, possibly from the
wrong place—as a complete account. Incorporated into the
mixture model, simple substitution can account only for, at
most, about half of the trials, relying on general pooling,
with its many degrees of freedom, to take up the slack.
Furthermore, supposing substitution on half the trials
demands implausible contortions of the general pooling
process to account for the other half. Substitution’s
weak contribution to the mixture model is embarrassing,
showing that it fails to account for the errors it was
invented to explain. Simple substitution accounts for
fewer than half of the similar-flanker reports. Pooling is
needed to account for the rest. Despite its elegant
simplicity, supposing simple substitution detracts from
parsimony if its explanatory burden is in addition to,
rather than instead of, the cost of explaining pooling.
Crowding is quickly emerging as a fundamental limit to
the recognition of all objects (Pelli & Tillman, 2008). This
study manipulated the similarity of letters to control
crowding. We found that flankers that crowd more are
reported more. This severely restricts the possible role of
unpooled substitution in crowding. On its own, unpooled
substitution cannot account for crowding. It is not enough.
Pooling is required. Pooling takes information from more
than one letter. Unpooled substitution is nonpooling (taking
information from no more than one letter). Disproving
unpooled substitution proves pooling.
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Appendix Mixture modeling
A. Introduction
The main text defines pooling as taking in more than one
object and (simple) substitution as nonpooling, taking in at
most one object. (We abbreviate simple substitution to just
substitution throughout the Appendix.) Here, we derive
upper bounds on the frequency of flanker substitution,
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 389target substitution, and both. We were pleasantly surprised
to obtain these bounds on substitution, despite allowing it
to perform any computation. The key is mixture
modeling. Measured human performance is an average
over many trials. The mixture modelsupposesthateachtrial,
randomly, is mediated by one of several simple processes. On
each trial, one of the three processes F, T, or TF is invoked
withcorrespondingprobabilitypF, pT,o rpTF,w h e r epF + pT +
pTF = 1. (F and T stand for flanker and target.T h eT F
process takes in the target and all the flankers.) The random
selection of a process is independent on each trial and
independent of the stimulus. It might seem artificial to
suppose mixing, but, in fact, it comes with the territory. The
substitution process, as defined here, receives only one letter,
unwittingly taken from one of several locations, as deter-
mined by spatial uncertainty. The letter received is either the
target (with probability pT) or a flanker (with probability pF).
That implies that the substitution processes’ performance is a
mixture of target and flanker substitution processes. The F
(flanker substitution) process produces a response based
solely on a flanker. The T (target substitution) process
produces a response based solely on the target. The two
processes are otherwise identical and have the same
fidelity: The substitution is faithful when it reports the
letter received, with probability seq.O t h e r w i s e ,i ti s
unfaithful, with probability 1 – seq. The TF (general
pooling) process produces a response based on the target
and flankers. If substitution gives a full account, then
pF + pT =1a n dpTF = 0. Except for the restriction of
stimulus information, these processes are unconstrained
and may perform any computation. Thus, the general
pooling process (TF) is utterly unconstrained, and we
invoke it here only to take up the slack (using its several
degrees of freedom, p1, p2, ... ), accounting for the trials
that substitution cannot. We do not insist that substitution
provide a full account. A partial account will do. But how
much can it account for?
Our mixture model assigns distinct processes to substitu-
tion of target and flanker but supposes that the two processes
are identical (implemented by the same processor), trans-
forming the input letter with no regard to where it came from.
Our analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 finds that
substitution can account for, at most, 60% of the trials,
leaving pooling to account for the rest, which it has
enough degrees of freedom to do. However, the
necessary values may seem implausible: Maximizing
the role of substitution requires that pooling never
reports a dissimilar flanker and never reports the target
when the flanker is dissimilar. If one supposes that the
pooling process must have nonzero rates for these
reports then the maximum possible role of substitution
is correspondingly reduced (Appendix E).
B. Experiment 1: With crowding. Similar and dissimilar
There are two ways of going about this. We can reason
about particular constraints, writing a discrete equation for
each one, or we can put all the constraints into a single
matrix equation and ask the computer to solve it for us.
Each approach has its merits, so we present both.
The mixture model supposes that each human response
probability is a linear combination of the response
probabilities of the three processes. For Experiment 1
(Table 1), we have
Data Response probability Process response probability Process probability
TF T F
0:32
0:23
0:09
0:36
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P target response ðÞ
P similar‐flanker response ðÞ
P dissimilar‐flanker response ðÞ
P absent‐letter response ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
PT t:r: ðÞ PF t:r: ðÞ PTF t:r: ðÞ
PT s:f:r: ðÞ PF s:f:r: ðÞ PTF s:f:r: ðÞ
PT d:f:r: ðÞ PF d:f:r: ðÞ PTF d:f:r: ðÞ
PT a:l:r: ðÞPF a:l:r: ðÞ PTF a:l:r: ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
pT
pF
pTF
2
6 6 4
3
7 7 5: ð1Þ
Every cell is a probability, between 0 and 1, and every
column adds up to 1.
In Experiment 1, an upper bound on the role of flanker
substitution is set by the dissimilar-flanker report rate (9%).
The report rates of the other two processes (T and TF)
cannot be negative, so the observed report rate of the
human observer is an upper bound on the report rate of the
flanker substitution process (F).
0:09   P dissimilar   flanker response ðÞ   pFPF d:f:r: ðÞ ð2Þ
Flanker substitution F is ignorant of the target, so it must
report similar and dissimilar flankers at the same rate. This
assumes, as in our experiments, that any given flanker letter
is equally likely to be similar or dissimilar to the target.
Flanker substitution with a 9% report rate accounts for less
than half of the similar-flanker reports (23%).
390 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396Above, we consider only one constraint of the model
and derive an upper bound. One can wonder whether
that upper bound is achievable, since other constraints
might intrude. For that we implement all the constraints
in our linear model, somewhat arbitrarily filling in a
few unspecified details (ssim and sdis) to show that at least
this instantiation of the model does, in fact, achieve that
upper bound.
Data Response probability Process response probability Process probability
TF T F
0:32
0:23
0:09
0:36
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P target response ðÞ
P similar‐flanker response ðÞ
P dissimilar‐flanker response ðÞ
P absent‐letter response ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
seq
ssim=12 þ sdis=13
2
p1
ssim=12
seq þ sdis=13
2
p2
sdis=13
seq þ sdis=13
2
p3
1   @3 1   @3 1   @3
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
pT
pF
pTF
2
6 6 4
3
7 7 5;
ð3Þ
where Σ3 is shorthand for the sum of the three cells
immediately above in that column, fidelity seq is the
probability of reporting the letter received, ssim is the
probability of reporting any of the 12 letters most similar to
it, and sdis =1– seq – ssim is the probability of reporting any of
the 13 letters most dissimilar to it. Thus, substitution has four
degrees of freedom, pT, pF, seq,a n dssim, and general pooling
has three: p1, p2,a n dp3. We used Excel with the Solver add-in
(http://www.solver.com/mac/dwnmacsolver.htm) to find the
solution that maximizes pF:
0:32
0:23
0:09
0:36
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P target response ðÞ
P similar‐flanker response ðÞ
P dissimilar‐flanker response ðÞ
P absent‐letter response ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
0:00 0:03 0:68
0:00 0:16 0:32
0:00 0:16 0:00
0:00 0:65 0:00
2
6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 5
0:00
0:55
0:45
2
6 6 4
3
7 7 5: ð4Þ
Specifically, Solver finds the solution that minimizes the
cost, which is the fraction of trials not carried out by flanker
substitution plus the squared error of the model’s fit to the
data: 1   pF þ 105 P
8r
PdataðrÞ PmodelðrÞ ðÞ
2, where r is the
kind of response, one for each row in the second
matrix in Eq. 4. Note that there is no target substitution
pT = 0 (top of rightmost matrix), so ignore the first
column of the big matrix. Attaining the upper bound,
flanker substitution is responsible for all the dissimilar-
flanker reports, pTPT d:f:r: ðÞ ¼ pTFPTF d:f:r: ðÞ ¼ 0.T h u s ,
flanker substitution accounts for pFPF s:f:r: ðÞ =P s:f:r: ðÞ ¼
0:55   0:16=0:23 ¼ 38% of the similar-flanker
reports.
Experiment 1 tested each flanker with various targets,
which is a revealing test of the flanker substitution
process. However, this experiment did not test each
target with various flankers, so it does not tell us much
about the target substitution process. Experiment 1
provides a useful upper bound on pF, but not pT.
Experiment 2 does that.
NotethatEqs.1–4 apply to Experiment 1 and that Eqs. 5–
7 apply to Experiment 2. The Excel spreadsheets used to
solve Eqs. 3 and 6 are provided in the online Supplement.
C. Experiment 2: With crowding. Similar or dissimilar
In Experiment 2, the two flankers were the same. The six-
letter alphabet consisted of two 3-letter groups: LTI NMW.
Letters were similar within a group and dissimilar across
groups. On each trial, the target and the flanker were
independent random samples from the alphabet. Thus, there
were three kinds of trials: identical (e.g., WWW), similar (MWM),
and dissimilar (LWL).
The mixture model supposes that each human
response probability in Experiment 2 (Table 2)i sa
linear combination of the response probabilities of the
three processes.
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TFT F
0:88
0:12
― ― ―
0:23
0:60
0:17
― ― ―
0:47
0:24
0:29
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P target response on identicaltrial ðÞ
P absent response on identical trial ðÞ
―― ―――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ―
P target response on similar trial ðÞ
P flanker response on similar trial ðÞ
P absent response on similar trial ðÞ
―― ―――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ―
P target response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
P flanker response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
P absent response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
PT t:r:o:i:t: ðÞ PF t:r:o:i:t: ðÞ PTF t:r:o:i:t: ðÞ
PT a:r:o:i:t: ðÞ PF a:r:o:i:t: ðÞ PTF a:r:o:i:t: ðÞ
―――――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ―
PT t:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PF t:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PTF t:r:o:s:t: ðÞ
PT f:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PF f:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PTF f:r:o:s:t: ðÞ
PT a:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PF a:r:o:s:t: ðÞ PTF a:r:o:s:t: ðÞ
―― ―――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ―
PT t:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PF t:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PTF t:r:o:d:t: ðÞ
PT f:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PF f:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PTF f:r:o:d:t: ðÞ
PT a:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PF a:r:o:d:t: ðÞ PTF a:r:o:d:t: ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
pT
pF
pTF
2
6 6 4
3
7 7 5 ð5Þ
Every cell is a probability, between 0 and 1. For each
kind of trial, the total response probability is 1.
Fidelity seq is the probability that a substitution process
emits the letter it received. Let ssim and sdis be the
probabilities of emitting a letter similar or dissimilar to
that received. That’s enough to allow us to write out all the
response probabilities for the T and F processes. The
general pooling process TF is unconstrained and has a
degree of freedom for each case. Thus, the mixture model
for Experiment 2 is
Data Response probability Process response probabilty Process probability
TFT F
0:88
0:12
― ― ―
0:23
0:60
0:17
― ― ―
0:47
0:24
0:29
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P target response on identicaltrial ðÞ
P absent response on identical trial ðÞ
―― ―――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ―
P target response on similar trial ðÞ
P flanker response on similar trial ðÞ
P absent response on similar trial ðÞ
―― ―――――― ―――――― ― ― ― ― ―
P target response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
P flanker response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
P absent response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
seq seq p1
1   seq 1   seq 1   p1
―― ―――――― ――――――
seq ssim=2 p2
ssim=2 seq p3
1   @2 1   @2 1   @2
―――――――― ――――――
seq sdis=3 p4
sdis=3 seq p5
1   @2 1   @2 1   @2
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
pT
pF
pTF
2
6 6 4
3
7 7 5; ð6Þ
where pTF =1– pT – pF and Σ2 is shorthand for the sum of
the two cells immediately above in that column.
Solver finds the solution that minimizes the cost, which
is the fraction of trials pooled plus the squared error of the
model’s fit to the data: pTF þ 105 P
8r
PdataðrÞ PmodelðrÞ ðÞ
2,
where r is the kind of response, one for each row in the tall
matrices in Eq. 6. The solution has minimum pooling pTF of
43%. This substitution process has four
2 degrees of
freedom, pF, pT, seq, and ssim, and the general pooling
2 It turns out that zeroing ssim or sdis does not affect this minimum much.
Nor does constraining their ratio. One could remove a degree of
freedom from substitution by supposing that all the unfaithful reports
are random guesses from the rest of the alphabet, which fixes sdis/ssim =
3/2. The spreadsheet provided in the online Supplement provides this as
an option.
392 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396process has five: p1, p2, p3, p4, and p5. Here is the solution
found by Excel and Solver:
0:88
0:12
0:23
0:60
0:17
0:47
0:24
0:29
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P targetresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
0:79 0:79 1:00
0:21 0:21 0:00
0:79 0:04 0:00
0:04 0:79 0:83
0:17 0:17 0:17
0:79 0:04 0:55
0:04 0:79 0:00
0:17 0:17 0:45
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
0:28
0:29
0:43
2
4
3
5: ð7Þ
Thus, if we maximize the role of substitution, it accounts
for pT þ pF ¼ 57% of the trials, and pooling accounts for
the remaining pTF = 43%. However, the mixture model also
fits the data well with less substitution, all the way down to
none at all, pT = pF = 0 and pTF =1 .
In modeling both experiments, we introduced param-
eters ssim and sdis to describe the distribution of
unfaithful responses, but they turn out not to matter for
present purposes. They do not constrain the role of
substitution.
NotethatEqs.1–4 apply to Experiment 1 and that Eqs. 5–
7 apply to Experiment 2. The Excel spreadsheets used to
solve Eqs. 3 and 6 are provided in the online Supplement.
D. Experiment 2: Confirmation
The previous section obtained a nice result. However,
minimization is tricky. One might find a local minimum
and miss the global minimum. So here we derive the same
upper bound on substitution, but in the old-fashioned way,
reasoning with discrete equations.
In Experiment 2, an upper bound on the role of flanker
substitution is set by the flanker report rate (24%) on
dissimilar trials:
pFPF flanker response on dissimilar trial ðÞ   P f:r:o:d:t: ðÞ :
ð8Þ
Our model (Eq. 6) says that PF(f.r.o.d.t.) = seq and that
P(f.r.o.d.t.) ≈ 0.24, so we can substitute
pFseq   0:24: ð9Þ
Similarly, an upper bound on the role of target
substitution is set by the target report rate (24%) on similar
trials:
pTPT target response on similar trial ðÞ   P t:r:o:s:t: ðÞ ð 10Þ
pTseq   0:23: ð11Þ
Summing Eqs. 9 and 11 yields
pT þ pF ðÞ seq   0:47; ð12Þ
which sets an upper bound on fidelity seq.Al o w e r
bound is set by the absent-letter rate (12%) on identical
trials:
pTPT absent letter response on identical trial ðÞ
þ pF PF a:l:r:o:i:t: ðÞ   P a:l:r:o:i:t: ðÞ ð 13Þ
pT þ pF ðÞ 1   seq
  
  0:12: ð14Þ
Summing Eqs. 12 and 14 yields an upper bound on
substitution:
pT þ pF   0:59: ð15Þ
Solving Eqs. 12 and 14 for seq yields explicit lower and
upper bounds on fidelity seq:
1   0:12= pT þ pF ðÞ   seq   0:47= pT þ pF ðÞ : ð16Þ
These bounds converge as pT + pF increases from zero
and coincide when pT + pF reaches its maximum of 0.59, at
which point 0.8 ≤ seq ≤ 0.8.
This result is practically the same as that in Eq. 7. (The
upper bound on substitution is 57% in Eq. 7 and 59% in
Eq. 15, both about 60%.) The result of the global
minimization depends on the somewhat arbitrary cost
function, so one should not expect exact agreement.
Thus, if we maximize the role of substitution, it accounts
for about 60% of the trials, and pooling accounts for the
remaining 40%. However, the mixture model also fits the
data well with less substitution, all the way down to none at
all, pT = pF = 0 and pTF =1 .
E. Summary
Pooling is needed to account for what substitution cannot.
Flanker substitution is blind to the target, so it cannot
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 393explain a difference in flanker report rate that depends on
flanker–target similarity. Target substitution is blind to the
flanker, so it cannot explain a difference in target report rate
that depends on flanker–target similarity. This assumes, as
was the case in our experiments, that every letter is equally
likely to be similar or dissimilar to an unknown target or
flanker. Thus, in both experiments, the dissimilar-flanker
report rate constrains flanker substitution to account for less
than half of the similar-flanker reports. In a similar way, in
Experiment 2, the target report rate on similar trials (23%)
constrains faithful target substitution to be, at most, 23%, so
target substitution accounts for less than half of the target
reports on dissimilar trials (47%). This is disappointing.
Substitution explains only half of the trials it was designed
to explain.
We find that substitution can account for, at most, 57%
of the trials, leaving pooling to account for the rest, which it
has enough degrees of freedom to do. However, the
necessary values may seem implausible: Maximizing the
role of substitution requires that pooling never reports the
target on similar trials and never reports a flanker on
dissimilar trials. If one supposes nonzero minimum fre-
quencies for such reports, the maximum possible role of
substitution is correspondingly reduced. We might some-
what arbitrarily suppose that, when the flanker is similar,
the frequency of reporting the target ought to be at least half
of the frequency of reporting the flanker,
PTF target response on similar trial ðÞ
  PTF flanker rsponse on similar trial ðÞ =2; ð17Þ
and that when the flanker is dissimilar, the frequency of
reporting it is at least as great as for reporting any given
absent letter,
PTF flanker response on dissimilar trial ðÞ
  PTF absent response on dissimilar trial ðÞ =4: ð18Þ
In terms of the free parameters of the general-pooling
model defined in Eq. 6, this becomes
p2  
p3
2
ð19Þ
p5  
1   p4   p5
4
: ð20Þ
Adding these two plausible constraints (in Solver)
reduces the (maximum possible) substitution rate pT + pF
from 57% down to 32% of the trials. (The spreadsheet in
the online Supplement makes these options available.)
In conclusion, pooling (with many degrees of freedom)
is needed to explain 100%–57% = 43% of the trials and
can explain them all. Substitution (with fewer degrees of
freedom) is not needed and can explain, at most, 57% of the
trials. (Adding mild constraints, Eqs. 17 and 18, to ensure
the plausibility of the general-pooling process reduces the
upper bound on substitution from 57% down to 32%.)
Since we have to suppose pooling, parsimony favors
dispensing with substitution and its extra explanatory
burden.
We have shown that when observers are asked to
identify a crowded object, nearly half of their reports are
based on a combination of information from target and
flankers, rather than being based on a single letter.
F. Experiment 3: Without crowding. Similar or dissimilar
Experiment 3 is analyzed in the same way as Experiment 2,
using the same three-process mixture model (Eq. 21).
However, the conditions and results are different, so
different model constraints are revealed when the same
model is fit to the new data. Experiments 1 and 2 were done
peripherally, and we expected crowding, but Experiment 3
was done centrally, so we do not expect crowding.
Data Response probability Process response probability Process probability
TF T F
0:63
0:37
0:52
0:22
0:26
0:60
0:10
0:30
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P targetresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
seq seq p1
1   seq 1   seq 1   p1
seq ssim=2 p2
ssim=2 seq p3
1   Σ2 1   Σ2 1   Σ2
seq sdis=3 p4
sdis=3 seq p5
1   Σ2 1   Σ2 1   Σ2
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
pT
pF
pTF
2
4
3
5 ð21Þ
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0:63
0:37
0:52
0:22
0:26
0:60
0:10
0:30
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
 
P targetresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on identical trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on similar trial ðÞ
P targetresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P flankerresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
P absentresponse on disimilar trial ðÞ
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
¼
0:61 0:61 0:82
0:39 0:39 0:18
0:61 0:10 0:00
0:10 0:61 1:00
0:28 0:28 0:00
0:61 0:06 1:00
0:06 0:61 0:00
0:33 0:33 0:00
2
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
0:84
0:08
0:08
2
4
3
5: ð22Þ
Starting at the left, the first matrix in Eqs. 21 and
22 is the human result. The second matrix is our model
for it. Each element in the third matrix is the probability,
given that a particular process is active, that it will emit
a particular response on a particular kind of trial. The
fourth matrix, last on the right, is the probability of each
kind of process being active on any given trial. Note
that, in this fit, we discover that the pooling process
(when invoked) always reports a flanker on similar trials
(p3 = 1.00) and always reports the target on dissimilar
trials (p4 =1 . 0 0 ) .
In Experiment 2, we found that all three processes were
similarly active: pooling, 43%; target substitution, 28%;
and flanker substitution, 29%. Here, in Experiment 3, 84%
of the trials are target substitution, and only a small fraction
are pooling (8%) or flanker substitution (8%). Substitution
accounts for 92% of the trials.
References
Andriessen, J. J., & Bouma, H. (1976). Eccentric vision: Adverse
interactions between line segments. Vision Research, 16, 71–78.
Ashby, F. G., Prinzmetal, W., Ivry, R., & Maddox, W. T. (1996). A
formal theory of feature binding in object perception. Psycho-
logical Review, 103, 165–192.
Bouma, H. (1970). Interaction effects in parafoveal letter recognition.
Nature, 226, 177–178.
Bouma, H. (1971). Visual recognition of isolated lower-case letters.
Vision Research, 11, 459–474.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision,
10, 433–436.
Chastain, G. (1982). Feature mislocalizations and misjudgments of
intercharacter distance. Psychological Research, 44, 51–65.
Cohen, A., & Ivry, R. (1989). Illusory conjunctions inside and outside
the focus of attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance, 15, 650–663.
D a k i n ,S .C . ,C a s s ,J . ,G r e e n w o o d ,J .A . ,&B e x ,P .J .( 2 0 1 0 ) .
Probabilistic, positional averaging predicts object-level
crowding effects with letter-like stimuli. J o u r n a lo fV i s i o n ,
10(10), 1–13.
Donk, M. (1999). Illusory conjunctions are an illusion: The effects of
target-nontarget similarity on conjunction and feature errors.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25, 1207–1233.
Estes, W. K. (1982). Similarity-related channel interactions in visual
processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Per-
ception and Performance, 8, 353–382.
Estes, W. K., Allmeyer, D. H., & Reder, S. M. (1976). Serial position
functions for letter identification at brief and extended exposure
durations. Perception & Psychophysics, 19, 1–15.
Gallant, J. L., & Garner, W. R. (1988). Some effects of distance and
structure on conjunction errors. Bulletin of the Psychonomic
Society, 26, 323–326.
Greenwood, J. A., Bex, P. J., & Dakin, S. C. (2009). Positional
averaging explains crowding with letter-like stimuli. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 13130–13135.
doi:10.1073/pnas.0901352106
Huckauf, A., & Heller, D. (2002). What various kinds of errors tell us
about lateral masking effects. Visual Cognition, 9, 889–910.
Ivry, R. B., & Prinzmetal, W. (1991). Effect of feature similarity on
illusory conjunctions. Perception & Psychophysics, 49, 105–116.
Kanwisher, N. (1991). Repetition blindness and illusory conjunctions:
Errors in binding visual types with visual tokens. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
17, 404–421.
Keele, S. W., Cohen, A., Ivry, R., Liotti, M., & Yee, P. (1988). Tests of
a temporal theory of attentional binding. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 14, 444–452.
Kooi, F. L., Toet, A., Tripathy, S. P., & Levi, D. M. (1994). The effect
of similarity and duration on spatial interaction in peripheral
vision. Spatial Vision, 8, 255–279.
Krumhansl, C. L., & Thomas, E. A. (1977). Effect of level of
confusability on reporting letters from briefly presented visual
displays. Perception & Psychophysics, 21, 269–279.
Lasaga, M. I., & Hecht, H. (1991). Integration of local features as a
function of global goodness and spacing. Perception & Psycho-
physics, 49, 201–211.
Levi, D. M. (2008). Crowding—An essential bottleneck for object
recognition: A mini-review. Vision Research, 48, 635–654.
Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D. (2005). Detection theory: A
user’s guide (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
“Mixture model.” Wikipedia. (2011). Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.
org/w/index.php?title=Mixture_model
Parkes, L., Lund, J., Angelucci, A., Solomon, J. A., & Morgan, M.
(2001). Compulsory averaging of crowded orientation signals in
human vision. Nature Neuroscience, 4, 739–744.
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The Videotoolbox software for visual psychophy-
sics: Transforming numbers into movies. Spatial Vision, 10, 437–
442.
Pelli, D. G., Majaj, N. J., Raizman, N., Christian, C. J., Kim, E., &
Palomares, M. C. (2009). Grouping in object recognition: The
role of a gestalt law in letter identification. Cognitive Neuropsy-
chology, 26, 36–49.
Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396 395Pelli, D. G., Palomares, M., & Majaj, N. J. (2004). Crowding is unlike
ordinary masking: Distinguishing feature integration from detec-
tion. Journal of Vision, 4(12), 1136–1169.
Pelli, D. G., & Tillman, K. A. (2008). The uncrowded window of
object recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 11, 1129–1135.
Põder, E. (2007). Effect of colour pop-out on the recognition of
letters in crowding conditions. Psychological Research, 71,
641–645.
Põder, E., & Wagemans, J. (2007). Crowding with conjunctions of
simple features. Journal of Vision, 7(2), 1–12.
Prinzmetal, W. (1981). Principles of feature integration in visual
perception. Perception & Psychophysics, 30, 330–340.
Prinzmetal, W. (1995). Visual feature integration in a world of objects.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 90–94.
Prinzmetal, W., Diedrichsen, J., & Ivry, R. B. (2001). Illusory
conjunctions are alive and well: A reply to Donk (1999). Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Perfor-
mance, 27, 538–541.
Prinzmetal, W., Henderson, D., & Ivry, R. (1995). Loosening the
constraints on illusory conjunctions: Assessing the roles of
exposure duration and attention. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 21, 1362–
1375.
Prinzmetal, W., & Keysar, B. (1989). Functional theory of illusory
conjunctions and neon colors. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General, 118, 165–190.
Prinzmetal, W., Presti, D. E., & Posner, M. I. (1986). Does attention
affect visual feature integration? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 12, 361–369.
Rapp, B. C. (1992). The nature of sublexical orthographic organiza-
tion: The bigram trough hypothesis examined. Journal of
Memory and Language, 31, 33–53.
Robertson, L. C. (2003). Binding, spatial attention and perceptual
awareness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 93–102.
Sperling, G. (1960). The information available in brief visual
presentations. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied,
74, 1–29.
Sperling, G., Chubb, C., Solomon, J. A., & Lu, Z. L. (1994). Full-
wave and half-wave processes in second-order motion and
texture. Ciba Foundation Symposium, 184, 287–303.
Strasburger, H. (2005). Unfocussed spatial attention underlies the
crowding effect in indirect form vision. Journal of Vision, 5(11),
1024–1037.
Strasburger, H., Harvey, L. O., & Rentschler, I. (1991). Contrast
thresholds for identification of numeric characters in direct and
eccentric view. Perception & Psychophysics, 49, 495–508.
Swets, J., Tanner, W. P., & Birdsall, T. G. (1961). Decision processes
in perception. Psychological Review, 68, 301–340.
Toet, A., & Levi, D. M. (1992). The two-dimensional shape of spatial
interactionzones in the parafovea. Vision Research, 32, 1349–1357.
Townsend, J. (1971). Theoretical analysis of an alphabet confusion
matrix. Perception & Psychophysics, 9, 40–50.
Treisman, A. (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinion in
Neurobiology, 6, 171–178.
Treisman, A., & Schmidt, H. (1982). Illusory conjunctions in the
perception of objects. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 107–141.
van den Berg, R., Roerdink, J. B. T. M., & Cornelissen, F. W. (2010).
A neurophysiologically plausible population code model for
feature integration explains visual crowding. PloS Computational
Biology, 6(1), e1000646. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000646
Vul, E., Hanus, D., & Kanwisher, N. (2009). Attention as inference:
Selection is probabilistic; responses are all-or-none samples.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138, 546–560.
Wolford, G. (1975). Perturbation model for letter identification.
Psychological Review, 82(3), 184–199.
Wolford, G., & Shum, K. H. (1980). Evidence for feature perturba-
tions. Perception & Psychophysics, 27, 409–420.
Author contributions
This work was performed while J.F. and R.C. were graduate student
and postdoctoral student, respectively, in the lab of D.G.P. J.F. thought
of using letter similarity to test substitution. J.F. and R.C. together
designed Experiment 1, collected the data, and wrote the first draft of
the manuscript. D.G.P. introduced the mixture model, wrote the
Appendix, and suggested Experiments 2 and 3. J.F. and D.G.P. further
developed the model and revised the manuscript and the Appendix
over many drafts. This is draft 100.
396 Atten Percept Psychophys (2012) 74:379–396